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Introduction to the Articles Presented by
Three Rising Stars in
Bankruptcy Scholarship
The Honorable Samuel L. Bufford*
Bankruptcy law is one of the fundamental legal structures
necessary to the functioning of a market economy. In the common
law tradition of the United States and England, bankruptcy law
dates back to 1542.1 Bankruptcy law's origins are even more an-
cient, with roots extending back to at least to the Hammurabi
Code2 and the Law of Moses.' In the transition to market econo-
mies and Western-style legal systems in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope, the development of a viable bankruptcy law is one of the first
priorities.4 Thus, the United States bankruptcy law5 that forms
the background for this symposium is central to the economy and
commercial life in the United States.
The Chapman Law Review's Bankruptcy Symposium seeks to
facilitate discussion among young bankruptcy scholars, and be-
tween these scholars and the local bankruptcy community, stu-
dents, faculty and distinguished scholars. These scholars have
engaged in research in important and exciting areas of bank-
ruptcy law. In addition, the symposium provides a forum for these
scholars to present papers which will make a substantial contribu-
tion to bankruptcy scholarship.
* United States Bankruptcy Judge, Central District of California.
1 The first bankruptcy law in England came during the reign of Henry the VIII in
1542. See An Act Against Such Persons as do Make Bankrupts, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, Ch. 4
(1542) (Eng). See generally Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bank-
ruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 325, 329 n.21 (1991). A more commonly known stat-
ute was enacted in the reign of Elizabeth I. See An Act Touching Orders for Bankrupts, 13
Eliz., ch. 7 (1570) (Eng.).
2 See CHILPERIC EDWARDS, HAMMURABI CODE AND THE SiNAriTc LEGISLATION § 117
3d ed. 1921) (providing for the discharge of a debt after the wife, son or daughter of the
debtor has worked for the creditor for three years). The commentary to this translation
provides extensive notes on the provisions relating to debt and distraint. Id. at 76-77.
3 Deuteronomy 15:1-5.
4 See, e.g., Samuel L. Bufford, Bankruptcy Law in European Countries Emerging
from Communism: The Special Legal and Economic Challenges, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 459,
463-65 (1996).
5 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter, section and rule references are to the Bank-
ruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1999), and to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure, Rules 1001-9036.
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In my judgment, these aspirations have been admirably met.
Professor David Epstein and I spent an entire day with these
young scholars, discussing their work and insights with the Chap-
man community. The discussion highlighted several insights into
bankruptcy law and policy, which will animate further discussion
on this subject.
In the remainder of this introduction, I comment briefly on
the distinctive contributions that each of these papers makes to
bankruptcy scholarship, and begin the further discussion of these
issues.
I. PROFESSOR FREDERICK TUNG'S PAPER
Professor Frederick Tung's paper addresses a distinctive
problem for a future claims representative (FCR) that arises only
in mass tort bankruptcy cases. Professor Tung's position is that
this agent has a distinct disadvantage because she has no princi-
pal to whom she is responsible. Instead, she is responsible to the
bankruptcy judge who appointed her. Professor Tung posits that
this fact raises additional, unique problems for mass tort cases.
A. Mass Tort Bankruptcy Cases Generally
Mass tort cases are rare in the bankruptcy system. During
some 14 years as a bankruptcy judge, I have handled more than
75,000 bankruptcy cases, including more than 2,500 chapter 11
cases. However, I have never presided over a mass tort case, nor
will most bankruptcy judges. Indeed, one could almost make a
short list of all the mass tort cases: A.H. Robins, Dow Coming,
UNR, Piper Aircraft, and the asbestos cases (Johns-Manville, Ea-
gle Picher and Amatex).
Nonetheless, mass tort bankruptcy cases are extremely im-
portant, because of their massive size. They typically consume
significant amounts of judicial time and resources. Administra-
tion costs of mass tort bankruptcy are equally astronomical. A
mass tort case concentrates in a single forum thousands, perhaps
hundreds of thousands, of separate litigation actions that would
otherwise consume large amounts of financial, legal and judicial
resources in many jurisdictions cumulatively.
This consolidation of litigation emphasizes the necessity of a
workable bankruptcy system for mass torts cases. No other proce-
dure for centralizing such large numbers of cases exists, when
these potential/actual suits may be filed in any jurisdiction in the
United States, in either federal or state court.6 Exclusively, bank-
6 The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has the power to transfer federal
court cases involving one or more common questions of fact to a single judge. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (1999). However, the Panel does not have the power to transfer state court cases.
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ruptcy law can bring large numbers of cases filed in numerous
state courts into a single collective proceeding. Further, the proce-
dure imposes an automatic stay on all of those cases pending in
other jurisdictions around the country. No other procedure pro-
vides for a centralized system of collecting assets and administer-
ing claims to minimize the transaction costs. No other procedure
has the power to bring all of the relevant assets to bear to solve
the mass tort problem before the magnitude of the claims is deter-
mined. No other procedure has the power to restructure the fi-
nances of the tortfeasor to assure the just resolution of all of the
mass tort claims. No other procedure has the power to resolve
multitudes of tort liabilities without trying on its merits each
claim that is not settled. No other procedure has nearly the power
to encourage settlement of large numbers of claims in a reason-
able time frame. No other procedure has the power to free assets
of the mass tortfeasor to continue in business free and clear of the
mass tort claims.
The bankruptcy system provides tools for dealing with mass
torts that are far more efficient, albeit not perfect, for administra-
tion of such suits than any available alternatives. Thus, the de-
velopment of concepts and rules for handling mass tort cases is
invaluable when such cases are filed.
Professor Tung limits his paper to certain types of mass tort
cases. In particular, he limits his analysis to cases involving tem-
porally segregated causal occurances from manifestation of dam-
ages. In some cases the delay in manifestation results from a
delay in the development of symptoms, as in the asbestos, Dalkon
Shield and breast implant cases. In other cases, such as Piper
Aircraft, products manufactured by the debtor may cause injury
long after they have entered into the stream of commerce.
These kinds of mass tort bankruptcy cases will surely con-
tinue to be filed in the future.7 In addition to the recurrence of
cases like those that we have already seen, yet-unimagined occur-
rences which will precede the suffering will give rise to more mass
tort bankruptcies.
In re Celotex Corp. "Technifoam" Prods. Liab. Litig., 68 F.R.D. 502, 504 n.2 (J.P.M.L. 1975).
Furthermore, such a transfer is for pretrial purposes only; a case must be returned to its
original venue for trial, absent consent of the parties. See Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss
Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 40 (1998).
7 For example, the tobacco companies are presently trying to amend tort law and to
fashion settlements with state and federal governments to avoid mass claims that drive
individual companies into bankruptcy. In addition, handgun manufacturers are already
turning to the bankruptcy courts to deal with claims that their products are unreasonably




B. Tort Claims in Bankruptcy
Tort claimants, as a general rule, tend to get less than their
share of assets due them in a bankruptcy case. Tort claimants
wrestle with the unliquidated character of their claims, while
claimants with greater priority, such as contract claimants, argue
that their claims entitle them to recovery. Contract claimants
typically contend as a matter of policy that they have supplied the
cash, or goods, or services, with a definite market value, for which
they deserve payment. In contrast, tort claimants do not provide
cash, goods, services, or even anything of value.
Additionally, contract claimants argue that tort claims, both
present and future, tend to be vastly inflated, and should not be
given credibility, and thus bargaining power, commensurate with
their size. Only when a settlement is reached, or a judgment af-
firmed, can a definite amount be attached to a tort claim. Mass
tort claims are usually unliquidated, and thus uncertain. While
bankruptcy law provides for the estimation of unliquidated
claims, the procedures for conducting such an estimation are un-
developed; often, neither the parties, nor the judges, know how to
correctly estimate the value of these claims. Finally, the punitive
damages that frequently accompany tort recoveries must be
subordinated to most other claims,' resulting in a typically value-
less punitive damages component expressed in a reorganization
plan.
C. Future Claimants
Future claimants are in a more precarious position. These po-
tential claimants must compete with present tort claimants,
whose claims are usually a large part of the unsecured debt in a
mass tort bankruptcy case. These existing claims may be suffi-
cient to eliminate the entire equity of the firm.
However, these future claimants may constitute a substantial
class, whose injuries either have not yet occurred or have not yet
manifested. Clearly, identification of the members of this class, at
the time of the bankruptcy filing, is impossible to determine. Typ-
ically, contract creditors want to exclude claimants from sharing
in the assets of a bankruptcy estate or being part of the reorgani-
zation plan.
In an attempt to deal with these problems, the bankruptcy
system has developed a process of appointing a special legal repre-
8 See § 726(a)(4). While this section does not apply strictly in a chapter 11 reorgani-
zation, the priorities in chapter 11 cases tend to be treated similarly to chapter 7, because
§ 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) requires that a creditor voting against a plan receive as much as that
creditor would receive in a chapter liquidation.
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sentative who serves as the FCR for the future claimants. 9 A trust
fund is set aside for the future claimants, a payment mechanism
is established, and a channeling injunction is issued to prohibit
future claimants from pursuing any claims except those against
the fund.10
Professor Tung contends that under this system future claim-
ants are likely to receive proportionally less compensation in a re-
organization. Equal treatment with the other unsecured
creditors, whether the debtor is liquidating or reorganizing, would
seem more appropriate. However, future claimants typically get
nothing at all."
Professor Tung finds two constraints on the function of the
FCR in a mass tort case bankruptcy which may impair her ability
to effectively represent the interests of future claimants. First, he
finds that the FCR is beholden to the presiding judge, rather than
a client, for appointment, employment of professional assistance,
and receipt of compensation for services. 2 Second, the FCR is con-
strained by the norms of large case participation, which promote a
deal rather than the obstruction of the confirmation of a consen-
sual reorganization plan. Both of these factors, in Professor
Tung's view, may lead the FCR to be less effective than an agent
for an existing claimant.
D. The Agency Problem
Professor Tung focuses on the difficulties encountered in effec-
tive representation of future claimants in the bankruptcy process.
He points out that future claimants could easily be the dominant
creditor group, 3 and could have a legitimate claim to a majority
ownership of the reorganized firm. 4 At the same time, if they are
not given sufficient notice of the bankruptcy case, their claims
9 Professor David Epstein, a panelist at this conference, was the FCR in the Piper
Aircraft case. Epstein v. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors, 58 F.3d 1573, 1574 (11th
Cir. 1995); see In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1994).
lO See, e.g., In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 203 B.R. 256, 280 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996).
See also In re Joint E.& S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 878 F. Supp. 473, 572 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
ii In contrast, future claimants under the Bankruptcy Act were not entitled to partici-
pate in the benefits, because their claims were not "provable," i.e., they could be liquidated
or estimated with reasonable certainty. See § 57(d), 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (repealed 1978) (the
Bankruptcy Act). In 1978, Congress repealed the Bankruptcy Act, effective October 1,
1979.
12 See Fredrick Tung, The Future Claims Representative in Mass Tort Bankruptcy, 3
CHAP. L. REV. 43, 67.
is Id. at 54. Actually, Professor Tung says that the future claimants will be the domi-
nant creditor group. However, this appears to be somewhat of an overstatement, because
in some cases the victims with manifest illness or injury will exceed those not yet injured or
suffering. For example, in the A.H. Robins and the Dow Corning cases, the future claim-
ants may be a smaller group than those already suffering, because the product causing




against the debtor cannot be barred, and the debtor cannot dis-
pose of its liability to them in the bankruptcy case. 5 Finally, the
contingency of the future claims and their temporal dispersion
makes them difficult to quantify. 16
The heart of Professor Tung's paper lies in his discussion of
the agency problems of the FCR. The future claimants cannot
choose their own agent, because their identity is unknown. 7 The
future claimants thus have no ability to select an agent who will
best represent them. In addition, they cannot fire the agent if the
agent's representation is less than adequate." Instead, the judge,
or the U.S. Trustee, chooses the FCR, and determines the terms of
her appointment. 9 Typically, the FCR is appointed at the request
of the debtor and other stakeholders. The debtor and stakehold-
ers' interests lie in maximizing their own recoveries in the bank-
ruptcy resolution.2"
A chapter 11 reorganization is fundamentally an exercise in
the negotiation of benefits by each of the stakeholders. In conse-
quence, the success of the FCR is largely determined by her nego-
tiating skill. Professor Tung argues, however, that because the
FCR has no principals, she finds it more difficult to bargain effec-
tively for the class of future claimants. Thus, the FCR has a
unique negotiating handicap: while she can bluster, she has the
least credible threat to defect.2'
This contention may not be entirely correct. It is very diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to confirm a plan of reorganization over the
objection of an FCR. This may put the FCR in a stronger bargain-
ing position than the other parties. An FCR may not be subject to
cramdown in case there is not a consensual plan.22 If a plan pro-
vides an insufficient share of the assets to provide for the future
claimants, the FCR will oppose a plan, and it can proceed only
under the cramdown provision. Opposition by the FCR may be
sufficient to doom such a plan.2"
In addition, Professor Tung contends that a mass tort case is
a "megabankruptcy," and that such cases have their own culture
and group norms.24 One of the most important norms of this group
is that a megabankruptcy case requires that a plan be confirmed,
15 Id. at 52.
16 Id. at 53.
17 Id. at 59-67.
18 Id. at 64.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 61.
21 Id. at 75.
22 See § 1129(b).
23 At his oral presentation, Professor Epstein reported he believed, in the Piper Air-
craft case, he could not be crammed down, which gave him substantial negotiating power.
See Epstein, supra n. 9.
24 See Tung, supra note 12, at 73.
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and that the plan be a consensual plan.25 In addition, social
norms require that everyone at the bargaining table receive a
share, which includes creditor classes giving up a share to equity.
According to Professor Tung, the future claims fund is the easiest
source for such a share.
2 6
I agree with Professor Tung that equity must be given a share
to facilitate a consensual plan. I am informed that the value of
obtaining equity's consent to a plan is approximately a 15% share
in the reorganized debtor. However, I am less inclined than Pro-
fessor Tung to expect that this share is likely to come from the
fund for future claimants. I think that the share for future claim-
ants tends to be less than they should receive. However, I think
that the primary problem for fully funding a proportionate share
for the future claimants lies in the difficulty in valuing their
claims.
E. Role of the Bankruptcy Judge
While lacking a traditional principal, the FCR is actually
under the control of the judge. The performance of the FCR is
dominated by the judge, who controls both the FCR's retention of
professionals, and the fees paid to both her and her hired
professionals.
Professor Tung asserts that the judge's interest in a mass tort
case lies mainly in promoting her prestige and reputation. These
factors are at issue much more in a mass tort case because it will
normally be the largest and most important of the judge's entire
judicial career. 28 Thus the judge is very interested in achieving a
successful reorganization. 29 This goal is more important than the
zealous representation of the rights of future claimants." In con-
sequence, the judge may choose an FCR who is more likely to go
along with a plan than to fight for the rights of the future
claimants.'
I respectfully disagree with Professor Tung's description of
the role of the bankruptcy judge in a mass tort case. My experi-
ence is that judges are not particularly invested in the success of
reorganizations.2 In fact, some 73% of chapter 11 cases do not
25 Id. at 74.
26 Id. at 75.
27 Id. at 67.
28 Id. at 69.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 70.
31 In Professor Tung's view, only this consideration can explain the fact that the judge
in the Robins case chose an FCR who was very junior and had very little experience, in a
case where the other players were very seasoned large case attorneys. Id.
32 Professor Tung points to the selection of a junior, inexperienced lawyer as the FCR
in the A.H. Robins case as evidence that the judge in a mass tort case has an investment in
20001
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lead to the confirmation of a plan of reorganization:"3 a substantial
majority are either converted to chapter 7 or dismissed. The par-
ties in interest, not the judge, are principally responsible for deter-
mining whether a business is worth more dead or alive. The
parties will conclude whether a negotiated plan which distributes
assets is preferable to the statutory plan in chapter 7.
Furthermore, bankruptcy judges rarely appoint an FCR.
While the Bankruptcy Code and rules are silent on the issue,
bankruptcy courts usually turn to the U.S. Trustee for the selec-
tion of an FCR, subject to confirmation by the court.' Where the
U.S. Trustee selects the FCR, the bankruptcy judge is less likely
to feel any investment in the outcome of the efforts of the FCR.
II. PROFESSOR TODD ZYWICI'S PAPER
In his article, Professor Todd Zywicki performs a great service
in pulling together a substantial body of economic studies that
bear on the economics of credit cards.3 5 These studies are pub-
lished in disparate sources that are generally difficult to find. Pro-
fessor Zywicki analyzes these studies to determine what they
collectively teach us about credit card debt, and its relation to con-
sumer bankruptcy cases. I comment here on a few of his points.
A. The Changing Role of Credit Cards
The role of credit cards in the United States economy has
changed quite dramatically in the last twenty years, and has be-
come far more extensive. Credit cards now play several roles in
the economy that they did not play in the past. First, credit cards
now serve as a transactional medium, where they have replaced
checks and cash. Second, credit cards have shifted the risk of pro-
viding credit from individual merchants to third-party credit card
issuers. Third, credit cards provide lending functions for consum-
ers, by permitting them to make purchases and to pay when they
are able. Fourth, credit cards are utilized extensively to finance
business debt, due to their convenience over traditional methods
the outcome. The case was unusual, however. It was handled largely by a district judge,
not the bankruptcy judge. Notably, an FCR is typically chosen by the United States
Trustee, not by the judge.
33 This figure is calculated from data contained in Ed Flynn, Who is Filing Chapter
11?, AMER. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1999, at 30.
34 This practice follows the procedure applicable to the appointment of a chapter 11
trustee or an examiner. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104 (1999); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2007.1. The ap-
pointment process was different in the A.H. Robins case, because it was an early mass torts
case and was filed before the adoption of the United States Trustee program (except in
certain pilot districts).
35 Professor Zywicki is also writing a companion piece on credit cards and bankruptcy,
which has not yet been published.
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of business credit. This change in the use and structure of credit
cards raises concerns about credit card issuer profitability.
B. The Level of Credit Card Profits
Are credit card profits too high? Professor Zywicki's response
is unclear. While he devotes substantial attention to explaining
how credit card interest rates may reasonably vary substantially
from rates for other loans, he never explicitly states whether his
explanation explains the variance.
I think that Professor Zywicki does not believe he needs to
answer this question directly. He holds the standard economist's
view that unreasonably high profits last only for a short term, ab-
sent barriers to entry. If the players in a market are making unu-
sual profits, they will quickly attract competitors desiring to share
the profits, who will drive the profit level down to a competitive
level." In the medium term, this strategy by competitors will
make any market competitive, unless barriers to entering the
market exist.37
Professor Zywicki argues that the barriers to entry in the
credit card market are indeed low. He notes that the principal
players in this market today did not have a substantial market
share even a few years ago; thus demonstrating market competi-
tiveness. In the long run, credit card interest rates will reflect the
credit risks that issuers underwrite and the costs of doing busi-
ness in this particular market.
However, this test may be too blunt. In their Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) use a much
more delicate measure. For evaluating horizontal mergers, they
consider a market competitive if a single seller who raises its
prices by 5% would lose enough sales to make the price increase
unprofitable.3' For example, if the market rate for credit card in-
terest is 18.0%, this market is competitive only if a credit card
issuer who raises its rates to 18.9% (a 5% increase) would lose
enough business that the rate increase would be unprofitable.
Further, the Antitrust Division and the FTC measure the con-
centration of a market by using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
(HHI) of market concentration. 39 "The HHI is calculated by sum-
ming the squares of the individual market shares of all the partici-
36 PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NoRDHAUs, ECONOMICS 136 (15th ed. 1995).
37 LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 114 (1977).
38 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGERS GUIDE-
LIES § 1.5 (1997), <www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/toc.html>. There are a
number of other analyses that the Department of Justice and the FTC perform to deter-




pants."40 A market with an HHI of less than 1000 is considered
unconcentrated; an HHI between 1000 and 1800 is moderately
concentrated, and an HHI exceeding 1800 is highly
concentrated.4
Professor Zywicki does not give us the market shares for the
major players in the credit card market, and I do not know where
such data can be found.42 For example, if a player has a 40% share
of the market, then the market would be highly concentrated. u If
two players each have a 20% share of the credit card market, then
the market likely would qualify as moderately concentrated.'
However, if no issuer controls over 10% of the market, then it will
likely qualify as an unconcentrated market, absent entry
barriers.45
However, the credit card market has a substantial entry bar-
rier. The barrier is marketing: the role of the billions of direct
mail credit card solicitations and millions of hours of credit card
marketing. 46 A credit card issuer that cannot send out large quan-
tities of credit card solicitations and make millions of telemarket-
ing calls, or who is not willing to take on this expense, may lose its
customers to those who do. Even at a response rate of one percent,
those who send out large numbers of credit card solicitations may
slowly, if not quickly, take market share away from any issuer
who does not match this solicitation rate. Even "affinity" credit
cards require substantial marketing efforts.
C. Does Too Much Credit Card Debt Cause High Rates of
Bankruptcy Filings?
Professor Zywicki contends that high levels of credit card debt
do not cause high rates of consumer bankruptcy filings. I am in-
clined to agree. Cases clearly exist where debtors have gone on a
spending spree, and run up credit card balances with the intent to
discharge these debts in bankruptcy. However, my experience in
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 The only information that I have been able to find is that the top 10 credit card
issuers had a 75.5% share of total receivables, apparently at the middle of 1999. See
Credit Cards, 1999 Near-Term Prosperity; Long-Term Threats to Income (visited March 9,
2000) <http://www.smrresearch.com/cc99.htm>.
43 The HIll index calculation for the 40% market share alone would be 1600 (40 x 40).
44 The HHI index calculation for each of the two 20% market shares would be 800 (202
+ 20 2). The squares of the market shares for the others likely would be at least another
200, which would make the total HHI index calculation exceed 1000.
45 If 10 market participants each controls 10% of the market, the HIll index for each
participant is 100, and the total is 1000 (102 + 102 +102 + 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 + 102 +
102). If the market distribution is more widely dispersed to any extent, the total cannot
reach 1000.
46 See Charles A. Docter, Impact of Credit Card Use on Consumer Bankruptcies, AM.
BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 1998, at 1, 42.
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handling more than 75,000 bankruptcy cases is that these cases
are unusual, and perhaps even rare.
Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook have documented the causes
of consumer bankruptcy." The principal causes are divorce,"8 job
loss,49 injury and illness.
Improvident credit card charges may play a role in consumer
bankruptcies. Undisciplined credit card spending may push a
consumer debtor over the brink, so that she is no longer able to
pay her debts and thus concludes that she needs bankruptcy re-
lief. In a typical scenario, the debtor takes on credit card debt at a
manageable level, given the debtor's income and expenses. Then
she suffers an economic catastrophe - she loses her job, gets a
divorce, becomes ill or is injured. At this point, she is no longer
able to service the credit card debt.
Sometimes the debtor uses credit card borrowings to try to
bridge the gap until the economic catastrophe is overcome. If this
effort is unsuccessful, the credit card issuer is likely to charge
bankruptcy abuse. However, the line of credit issued when the
account was opened is an invitation to use it when needed.51
III. PROFESSOR GEBBiA-PiNETrI'S PAPER
Professor Gebbia-Pinetti's paper is a fascinating, valuable,
and insightful study in statutory interpretation as conducted by
the United States Supreme Court. Her study is distinctive in
three ways: it is an empirical study of every Bankruptcy Code de-
cision the Supreme Court has issued; it examines the Court's
methods, not merely its holdings; and it examines and compares
each separate opinion, majority, concurrence and dissent, rather
than simply focusing on the methods used in the majority opin-
ions. The statute that she chooses for her study is the United
States Bankruptcy Code. Since it went into effect on October 1,
1979, the Code has given rise to forty-eight decisions by the Court
beginning in 1982. In carrying out her analysis, Professor Gebbia-
Pinetti examines each of the Supreme Court opinions at issue, in-
cluding the concurring and the dissenting opinions.
47 TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN AND JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOKi, THE
FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (Yale University Press, forthcoming 2000); see
generally TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN AND JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, AS
WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA (1989) [herein-
after As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS].
48 As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS, supra note 47, at 160 n.8; 181-82.
49 Id. at 8, 196.
50 Id. at 8, 166-77.
51 Professor Zywicki does not appear to quarrel with this analysis. He argues this
realization is a fundamental feature of credit card lending, and that it is one of the impor-
tant reasons why credit card interest rates have remained sticky.
2000]
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Professor Gebbia-Pinetti uses a two-step system for her anal-
ysis. First, she catalogs the various methods of statutory interpre-
tation the Court uses in the forty-eight decisions, to determine
which method or combination of methods of statutory interpreta-
tion the Court utilizes in each opinion. Second, she examines the
results of this analysis, to look for patterns of statutory interpre-
tation by the Supreme Court.
Professor Gebbia-Pinetti's purpose is to determine whether,
for purely statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court's opinions
reveal either (1) a consistent interpretive method or (2) consistent
patterns of interpretation.52 Furthermore, what Professor Gebbia-
Pinetti hopes to do, but leaves for another day, is to use an analy-
sis of the unique characteristics of the Bankruptcy Code and over-
arching principles and theories of statutory interpretation to
critique the Court's chosen methods for interpreting the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Additionally, this study fits into a larger context of
debate, which has been raging for at least twenty years among
judges, practitioners, and scholars of law and other disciplines
(such as philosophy, linguistics, and political science), on interpre-
tive models and interpretive methods for statutory analysis. The
proper methods of statutory interpretation have stimulated sub-
stantial literature, and there are several schools of thought on the
issue.,
A. Results
Professor Gebbia-Pinetti finds that the Supreme Court gener-
ally decides bankruptcy cases based upon principles of statutory
interpretation, rather than on substantive bankruptcy policy.55
Although half of the forty-eight cases that she analyzes were de-
cided without dissent, these opinions do not disclose a consistent
interpretive method. At the same time, apart from constitutional
questions and conflicts with other statutes, most of the separate
opinions are founded on disputes as to interpretive method. 6 In
particular, these disputes center on two canons of interpretation:
the "plain meaning" canon and the "pre-Code" canon. The pre-
Code canon suggests a discriminate use of the plain meaning ca-
non for practices under the Bankruptcy Code which vary widely
from established practices under the Bankruptcy Act.57
52 See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Emperical
Study of the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 180. [hereinafter
Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code]
53 Id.
54 See generally Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legiti-
macy and Legal-System Values, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 234 & nn.1-2 (1997).
55 See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 52 at 97.
56 Id.
57 See Gebbia-Pinetti, at 274.
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Professor Gebbia-Pinetti concludes that the Supreme Court
Justices disagree among themselves as to the proper method for
interpreting the Bankruptcy Code.58 She finds Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas at one pole, favoring a textual approach as the
primary method of statutory interpretation for the Bankruptcy
Code. Conversely, she finds Justice Stevens at the other pole
favoring a more flexible interpretative model. In between, she
finds the other Justices, who tend to be less textual than Justices
Thomas and Scalia, but not so flexible as Justice Stevens.59 The
method of interpretation utilized in a particular case turns, at
least in part, on the identity of the Justice who writes the major-
ity, or unanimous, opinion.
The complete absence of Supreme Court opinions deciding
bankruptcy cases on policy grounds is surprising. Published
bankruptcy opinions in the lower courts, including the courts of
appeals, often rest on policy grounds. Furthermore, much of the
bankruptcy scholarship in recent years is based on policy analysis
and arguments. Professor Gebbia-Pinetti leaves this suggestive
issue also for another day.
Additionally, the Supreme Court does not rely heavily on con-
gressional intent in interpreting the Bankruptcy Code. For exam-
ple, even in Fidelity Financial Services., Inc. v. Fink,60 where the
Supreme Court based a bankruptcy decision on the intent of Con-
gress, the unanimous opinion authored by Justice Souter found
the intent in the text, structure and history of the provision at
issue, and not in legislative history." The Supreme Court is ap-
parently very reluctant to use legislative history to interpret the
Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the Court, especially since Justice
Scalia joined, is more apt to consult text, structure and broad his-
tory rather than specific statements in the legislative history.
I believe this reluctance to base statutory interpretation on
congressional legislative history is sometimes well placed. The
quality of legislative history is uneven: sometimes it is written by
congressional staffers after the fact, where part of the purpose is
to correct legislative deficiencies, or even to adopt positions that
Congress refused to take.
However, the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code is
one of the best examples of legislative history, and is routinely
consulted by lower courts and scholars, as well as practicing attor-
neys, as a reasonably authoritative guide to interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code.
58 Id. at 294.
59 Id.
60 522 U.S. 211 (1998).
61 Id. at 221.
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B. Scope of the Study
Although her study provides valuable data concerning Bank-
ruptcy Code interpretation, Professor Gebbia-Pinetti cautions that
her study alone is not a comprehensive examination of every as-
pect of Bankruptcy Code interpretation. Other topics that merit
examination include (i) whether the interpretive methods em-
ployed by the lower courts differ from the methods employed by
the Supreme Court in bankruptcy cases, and, if so, how the con-
straints of precedent affect lower courts' interpretive methods; (ii)
the extent to which the use of conflicting interpretive methods
causes splits among the courts in bankruptcy cases; and (iii) the
binding or persuasive effect of rationale and interpretive method.
Indeed, Professor Gebbia-Pinetti will chair a panel of schol-
ars, practitioners, and judges who will explore these and other
topics further in a program entitled "Everything You Always
Wanted to Know About Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code," at the
2001 concurrent annual meeting of the American Bar Association
Business Bankruptcy Committee and the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges.
Building on the insightful analysis of Bankruptcy Code inter-
pretation at the United States Supreme Court that Professor Geb-
bia-Pinetti has given, I outline here my own views of the
differences in interpretive methods that appear in the lower
courts. These comments go beyond the scope of Professor Gebbia-
Pinetti's paper. However, her paper's excellent description of in-
terpretive methods utilized by the Supreme Court makes it much
easier to articulate these differences that appear at the lower
court level.
1. Statutory Interpretation in the Lower Courts
In order to determine how lower courts interpret the Bank-
ruptcy Code, we should look at the written opinions and other de-
cisions of the lower courts. There are several important
differences between judicial reasoning in statutory construction
cases by the Supreme Court and such reasoning by a lower court.
These differences make the reasoning process at the Supreme
Court different in important respects from that by the lower
courts.
In my experience as a judge, the task of a lower court, in a
statutory interpretation case, is to decide each case that comes
before it on the facts of the individual case,62 according to the ap-
62 Making findings of fact is another role of the trial court that is absent at the
Supreme Court, and in any other appellate court. While fact finding is a very important
task of the trial court, my comments focus only on the application of the law to the facts, a
task which both the trial courts and the appellate courts perform.
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plicable law as the court can discern it, based on appropriate
methods of statutory interpretation. These methods include all of
those used by the Supreme Court, although only some may be ap-
plied in a particular case, some are not utilized by the Supreme
Court at all. The lower courts are, of course, obligated to follow
the teachings of the Supreme Court. Yet, one of the most impor-
tant results of Professor Gebbia-Pinetti's study shows a vast di-
chotomy exists between the Supreme Court's approach and that of
the lower courts, and indeed, of commentators.
2. The Role of Precedent
Perhaps the most important difference between the Supreme
Court and lower courts is that the Supreme Court is not bound by
the precedents of any higher court. Indeed, the Supreme Court is
also not bound by its own precedents. The general approach of the
Supreme Court to precedent is therefore quite different from that
of the lower courts. For the most part, the Supreme Court devotes
its attention to its own precedents, and gives little consideration
to the published opinions of lower courts.
However, the lower courts are frequently bound by precedents
in making their decisions. The reasoning of a lower court must
include a consideration of such binding precedents. Usually the
binding precedents come from a higher court with appellate juris-
diction over the lower court making the decision. In addition, for
at least some circuit courts, binding precedents include prior deci-
sions of the same court.63 In a published opinion, the reasoning of
a lower court must take account of the relevant binding prece-
dents, and show how the decision in the case at issue is consistent
with them.
Non-binding published decisions of other courts also have
precedential value in the lower courts. In a bankruptcy court, for
example, the published opinions of other bankruptcy courts are
entitled to deference, the published opinions of district courts are
entitled to great deference, and the published opinions of courts of
appeals of other circuits are entitled to very great deference. In
contrast, such deference to an opinion of another court is almost
unknown in the Supreme Court.
63 In the Ninth Circuit, for example, a rule prohibits a three-judge panel from overrul-
ing prior precedent in the Circuit. Only an en banc panel has the authority to overrule such
a prior decision. See FED. R. App. P. 35(a)(1): ("An en banc hearing or rehearing is not
favored and ordinarily will not be ordered unless: (1) en banc consideration is necessary to
secure or maintain uniformity of the court's decisions ... ."). The Ninth Circuit Court rule
regarding rehearings en banc (R. 35-1) states:
When the opinion of a panel directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another
court of appeals and substantially affects a rule of national application in which
there is an overriding need for national uniformity, the existence of such conflict is
an appropriate ground for suggesting a rehearing en banc.
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Furthermore, a non-binding decision of a circuit court re-
ceives special consideration in a different circuit. A circuit court
will not normally take a position contrary to that of another cir-
cuit without giving substantial consideration to whether its deci-
sion will create, or extend, a split of the circuits.
3. Practices Under Bankruptcy Act
One of the most important grounds for interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code in the Supreme Court is the practice under the
Bankruptcy Act, which was repealed in 1978." The Supreme
Court's inconsistent treatment of practice under the Bankruptcy
Act as a basis for interpreting the Code, in Professor Gebbia-
Pinetti's view, may leave lawyers with insufficient guidance on
this issue. 5 However, practices under the Bankruptcy Act are
rarely important in the lower courts. The bankruptcy courts have
handled some 15 million cases under the Code. Published deci-
sions under the Code fill more than 240 volumes of the West
Bankruptcy Reporter.66 The circuit courts and bankruptcy appel-
late panels have published thousands of opinions interpreting var-
ious provisions of the Code. Only an occasional reported opinion
at the trial or intermediate appellate level considers pre-Code law,
and only a rare opinion considers that law important in deciding a
new case.
The Supreme Court turns to pre-Code practice in interpreting
the Code only because, as pointed out supra, it refuses to be in-
formed by the wealth of case law interpreting the Code at the
lower court level. The Supreme Court should base its Bankruptcy
Code interpretation on practice under the Code as reported in
lower court published opinions, rather than on pre-Code practice
under a quite different statute.
4. Functional Analysis
Professor Gebbia-Pinetti notes the lack of functional analysis
in Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Bankruptcy Code.67
There may be a good reason for the lack of functional analysis by
the Supreme Court. Most of the Supreme Court Justices are en-
tirely lacking in substantial bankruptcy practice experience.
Their law clerks have come straight from law school and prior
clerkships, and likewise lack bankruptcy practice experience.
64 Pub. L. No. 95-598, Title IV, § 401(a), 92 Stat. 2682 (1978) (the repealer provided:
"the Bankruptcy Act [Act July 1, 1848, c.541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended] is repealed").
65 See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 52, at 297.
66 The publication of West Bankruptcy Reporter coincided with the Bankruptcy
Code's taking effect. The first several volumes include some opinions in cases filed under
the Act. These soon gave way to cases filed almost exclusively under the Code.
67 See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 52, at 274.
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Functional analysis of bankruptcy statutory provisions may be be-
yond the expertise of the Supreme Court.
C. What Difference Does Interpretive Method Make?
Many legal scholars think that a court's choice of an interpre-
tive method in a particular case is quite important.' I disagree.
1. Results of Varying Interpretive Methods
Scholars have charged that the Supreme Court's use of vary-
ing interpretive methods in Bankruptcy Code interpretation pro-
duces undesirable results. Professor Gebbia-Pinetti summarizes
the criticisms:
[Tihe Court's use of [varying] interpretive methods undermines
predictability and stability, increases costs, ignores congres-
sional intent, impairs bankruptcy law by preventing the Court
from developing a coherent bankruptcy policy and jurispru-
dence, leaves the lower courts with inadequate guidance con-
cerning how to interpret the Bankruptcy Code, and contributes
to confusion and split decisions among the lower courts.69
Indeed, one could posit the opposite view on most of these
charges: that the method of reasoning adopted in a Supreme
Court decision does not affect the outcome at all; that it does not
affect the predictability or stability of the law; that it does not im-
pair the development of bankruptcy policy and jurisprudence; and,
that it does not lead to confusion or split decisions among the
lower courts.70 I leave the development of these arguments for an-
other day.
One of these complaints is accurate. Where statutory inter-
pretation is based on plain meaning, congressional intent is disre-
garded. This interpretation is premised on the view that Congress
enacted the statute, not its intent. If the statute and the intent
diverge, the statutory language must govern. If Congress made a
mistake, according to this view, then Congress, not the courts,
should fix the error. This position, in my view, merits credence.
In fact, I utilize this method quite often for deciding the easy cases
that come to my court. However, these are not cases in which I
would write an opinion for publication.
68 Professor Gebbia-Pinetti appears to agree with the view of these other scholars.
However this point is not central to her paper.
69 Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 52, at 176-77, and sources cited therein. While Profes-
sor Gebbia-Pinetti does not tell us whether she agrees with these charges, they provide the
context for her study.
70 There clearly is one additional context where Professor Gebbia-Pinetti's results are
very important. If a lawyer has a case pending before the United States Supreme Court,




However, the Supreme Court's utilization of a consistent
method of interpreting the Bankruptcy Code might not give useful
guidance to the lower courts. As explained in more detail infra,71
a method of statutory interpretation adopted by the Supreme
Court is not binding on lower courts. Thus, its impact is, at best,
only persuasive.
My perspective is different than Professor Gebbia-Pinetti's. I
believe that when a Supreme Court Justice signs onto an opinion,
the Justice agrees with the result in the particular case, and with
the rule of law on which it is based. The Justice may not agree
that the reasoning in the opinion is the best way to explain the
result, but likely the Justice agrees that the reasoning in the opin-
ion is a suitable way to explain it. The Justice may take the view
that, if she were writing the opinion herself, she might use a dif-
ferent interpretive method to arrive at the same result.
I believe some Supreme Court Justices agree with this view.
Others, notably Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas, frequently do
not. In the federal appellate courts generally, I believe that this
view is often adopted. Indeed, an appellate judge may be charged
with a lack of collegiality if the judge refuses to accede to this
viewpoint.
An analogy may help illustrate my view. In the days of the
Roman Empire it was said that all roads led to Rome. Thus
whichever road one took, one arrived at the same place. "Rome" in
my analogy includes both the result and the applicable rule for
arriving at the result (the ratio decidendi). The method of statu-
tory interpretation may be different, just as the road leading to
Rome may be different. For many Justices in many Supreme
Court cases, as well as for lower appellate court judges, I suggest
that this analogy explains why they sign onto opinions that differ
in interpretive method from what a Justice or judge might write
herself.
An opinion by a trial judge, in contrast, picks only a single
road to Rome, because the only judge involved in the opinion is the
author. However, a different trial judge might write a different
opinion based on a different interpretive method arriving at the
same result. Nonetheless, the two judges would agree both on the
outcome and on the rule of law on which the outcome is based.
This analogy leaves unanswered how a Justice or judge de-
cides that "Rome" is the proper destination in the first place. This
is a complex issue, and is beyond the scope of this comment. How
a Justice or judge arrives at a result for a particular case is a very
different question from how the judge explains and justifies it,
which is what is found in a written opinion.
71 See text at notes p. 39, infra.
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Does the choice of interpretive method lead to a different re-
sult in any of the Supreme Court bankruptcy cases? The answer
is not clear. Professor Gebbia-Pinetti shows that there are twenty
cases out of forty-eight where the dissent argues that the majority
has adopted the wrong interpretive method, and that the result
should be different.72 However, the majority may have arrived at
the same result using a different interpretive method, even the
one argued for in the dissent. Thus the evidence is inconclusive on
this issue.
2. Binding Force of Interpretive Method
The methods of statutory interpretation utilized by the
Supreme Court do not bind lower courts. Lower courts are bound
by the holdings of a higher court. The holding in a particular case
is the particular rule, or rules, of law which, when applied to the
facts of the particular case, lead to its outcome. For example, in
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers7 a the Supreme Court held
that "future labor, management, or expertise" does not constitute
new "value" sufficient to qualify for the possible exception or corol-
lary to the absolute priority rule codified in Section 1129 (b). 4 In
contrast, the Court declined to decide in Ahlers whether the new
value rule itself, first articulated in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber
Products. Co.,7 5 continued to be viable under the Bankruptcy
Code.76
The holding in Ahlers that labor, experience and expertise do
not qualify as new value (known as the "sweat equity" rule) is
binding on lower courts. However, the method of reasoning that
the Court used to arrive at its holding is not binding on lower
courts. While lower courts may find the method of reasoning per-
suasive, they may not.
Indeed, federal trial and appellate courts traditionally have
used a wide variety of methods of reasoning to arrive at their con-
clusions. These methods include all those Professor Gebbia-
Pinetti discusses in her article, and others as well.
Methods of statutory interpretation are widely debated, and
vary from judge to judge and from time to time. Changes in the
future composition of the Court will likely result in different views
of statutory interpretation. In addition, as Professor Gebbia-
Pinetti points out, the same Justice may use different methods of
interpretation from case to case, with no explanation for choosing
one method over another on a particular occasion.
72 See Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 52, at 273.
73 485 U.S. 197 (1988).
74 Id. at 203.
75 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
76 See Ahlers, 485 U.S. at 205, 206.
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D. Statutory Adjudication vs. Constitutional Adjudication
Finally, I should say a word about the contrast between statu-
tory adjudication and constitutional adjudication. One of the prin-
cipal roles of the United States Supreme Court is to serve as
guardian of the United States Constitution. The Court is the final
step in the judicial review of the constitutionality of either federal
or state law.
There is a striking difference between statutory adjudication
and constitutional adjudication at the level of the Supreme Court.
Constitutional principles are painted in broad language, such as
"the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,"77
"the equal protection of the laws,""8 and "the freedom of speech, or
the press."v These principles are elaborated in case law, often
with no implementing legislation. In contrast, even an unanno-
tated version of the Bankruptcy Code runs 164 pages.
Constitutional adjudication provides much more room for dis-
agreement among the Supreme Court Justices, because the text is
so much shorter and unlimiting. For the same reason, the Jus-
tices are much more likely to disagree as to the application of a
constitutional provision in a particular case, and dissents are
much more likely.
For an example of constitutional adjudication, consider the
Supreme Court's recent Eleventh Amendment opinions,8' each de-
cided by a five-to-four majority. The Eleventh Amendment seems
to have a plain meaning. However, none of the recent Eleventh
Amendment decisions, beginning with the Seminole Tribe8 case,
is supportable based on a "plain meaning." At the same time,
none of these recent opinions, whether majority or dissenting,
even argues for a plain meaning interpretation of the amendment.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing comments only begin to touch on the important
insights in the papers presented at this symposium. Each of the
papers is important and makes a substantial contribution to
bankruptcy scholarship. My comments in this introduction begin
the further development of these insights.
Finally, it is important to recognize the valuable contribu-
tions that have been made by the organizers of this symposium.
77 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
78 Id.
79 Id. amend. I.
80 See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents,_ U.S. -, 120 S. Ct. 631 (2000); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S 706 (1999); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Ex-
pense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
81 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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